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Abstract 
 
Conservation of coniferous forests is a significant contribution to preserving biodiversity in 
Norway. At present about 2.7 percent of the productive forest area in Norway is conserved, while 
ecologists recommend at least 4.6 percent to have sufficient protection of biodiversity in 
Norwegian forests. Thus, from an ecological point of view, an increase in the conserved forest 
area is necessary. However, it comes at a cost to both local communities and the population as a 
whole. While the social benefits of conserving forest areas accrue to all households in Norway, 
the immediate costs in terms of foregone earnings will be borne by the local communities if they 
are not compensated for their economic losses by national authorities. The conservation process 
is often dominated by conflicts between pro-conservation interests at the national level and anti-
preservation interests at the local level. The costs at the local level are not always taken into 
account at the national level as some of these costs are not considered to be social costs, but 
rather a distributive effect. This makes an extension of the conserved forest area 
harder to obtain in practice. 
 
This thesis considers the costs, incurred by municipalities, due to establishing Norway's largest 
forest reserve, Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve, and discusses to what degree they were 
compensated for these costs through a Development Trust Fund (DTF) from the government. 
Cost-benefit analyses (CBA) at both the local and the national level are performed for different 
scenarios of losses and gains. The results show that a DTF almost fully compensates the 
municipalities for their costs as a result of the conservation. Seen in the light of other instruments, 
a DTF is found to be most appropriate in high conflict areas, where conservation otherwise 
would be difficult to implement.  
  
IV 
 
Sammendrag 
 
Vern av skog er en viktig del av bevaringen av biologisk mangfold i Norge. Per i dag er 2,7 
prosent av produktiv skog vernet, men for å oppnå tilstrekkelig beskyttelse av arter anbefales det 
å øke vernet til 4,6 prosent (Framstad et al., 2002). Denne økningen har effekter både på 
nasjonalt og lokalt plan. Mens nytten av skogvern tilkommer alle husholdninger i Norge, vil en 
stor del av kostnadene falle på lokalsamfunn i form av tapte muligheter for skogdrift og næring. 
Skogvernprosesser er ofte svært konfliktfylte, der naturverninteresser på nasjonalt nivå møter 
vernemotstand på lokalt nivå. Fra et nasjonalt ståsted blir mange av de lokale kostnadene ikke 
sett på som kostnader for samfunnet, men heller som fordelingseffekter som jevnes ut. Dette 
bidrar til at økningen i andel vernede skogområder blir vanskelig å oppnå.  
I denne masteroppgaven vil jeg evaluere lokale kostnader for tre kommuner som fikk deler av 
sine arealer vernet gjennom opprettelsen av Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell naturreservat, og om 
kommunene ble kompensert for disse kostnadene ved å motta et næringsfond. Dette vil 
analyseres gjennom nytte-kostnadsanalyser på både lokalt og nasjonalt nivå. Gjennom den lokale 
nytte-kostnadsanalysen testes hypotesen om næringsfondet dekker kostnadene kommunene har 
ved vernet. Deretter undersøker den nasjonale nytte-kostnadsanalysen om nytten ved vernet er 
høy nok til å forsvare en kompensasjon av kommunenes kostnader. Under forutsetningen om at 
kommunene har kostnader som myndighetene har mulighet til å kompensere for, vurderes så 
ulike politiske/økonomiske virkemidler som brukes eller kunne blitt brukt for å øke vernet areal.  
I analysen konluderes det med at næringsfondet dekker det meste av kommunenes tap ved vernet 
og at nytten ved vernet er så stor at kompensasjon kan forsvares. Sett i lys av andre virkemidler 
vurderes næringsfondet som mest egnet i situasjoner der frivillig vern er vanskelig å 
gjennomføre.  
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1 Introduction 
Norway is obliged through the Convention on Biological Diversity to protect endangered species, 
fight foreign species, establish conserved areas and promote international cooperation in order to 
protect biodiversity (Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management, 2012). A significant part of 
this work is preserving species living in forests.  
About 60 percent of all known mainland species
2
 in Norway have connection to forests (Gjerde, 
Brandrud, Ohlson, & Ødegaard, 2010). At present 2.7 percent of productive forest is conserved, 
while a recommended goal to achieve sufficient protection to avoid further loss of species is 4.6 
percent of productive forest (Framstad et al., 2002). Reaching this goal and following up on 
international commitments requires action on both governmental and local level. 
Conservation of an area often leads to conflict as the local actors lose the opportunity to use the 
area the way they have done previously. In forest conservation cases the conflict level is often 
high despite the fact that the forest owners get compensated for lost income from forestry. 
Previous research in the field has had a predominant focus on forest owners and how they can be 
compensated in conservation cases. Although this is important, there are also other actors that are 
affected by the conservation of an area.  
An official government report on global environmental challenges (NOU 2009:16, p. 120) 
recommends an assessment of instruments that encourage municipalities to take biodiversity into 
account in decision making. Understanding the cost of conservation on the local level is crucial 
for understanding which instruments to use to promote conservation locally. Many municipalities 
are reluctant to have conservation within their borders, even if they are compensated for costs of 
administrating the area. Why are they not taking initiative to conserve? Are there any overlooked 
costs that could create this reluctance?  
The conservation of an area within a municipality leads to positive externalities for surrounding 
areas, and potentially the rest of the country, that the municipality may not be compensated for. 
This market failure causes the provision of biodiversity protection to be lower than the socially 
optimal level. In addition to this, encouraging conservation amongst the municipalities is made 
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 All known species except microorganisms. 
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even more difficult when they potentially are forgoing tax revenues and job opportunities that 
contribute to their economic growth. Furthermore, the Nature Diversity Act and Forestry Act 
mandate municipalities with a number of forest conservation tasks whose management costs may 
currently not be fully compensated, and/or are not being carried out to the minimum intended by 
the law (Riksrevisjonen, 2012).  
The EU-project POLICYMIX (Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, 2013) is evaluating the 
cost-effectiveness and incentive effects of economic instruments for increasing protection of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. One of the proposed instruments in the POLICYMIX 
project is a state-to-municipality transfer of funds, which could give incentives for municipalities 
to conserve more. In the context of this project, this thesis will evaluate compensations in a case 
study of the Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve in southeastern Norway. Here a state-to-
municipality “local development trust fund”3 was used. The trust fund will be compared to other 
alternative approaches to compensation of municipal costs of conservation currently in use in 
Norway and other countries participating in POLICYMIX (Barton et al., 2012).  
The emphasis on municipalities does not exclude nor diminish the significance of a well-
functioning compensation scheme for forest owners, but rather seeks to incorporate some of the 
concerns among both forest owners and other locals in the process of conservation. The 
municipality as a tax collecting entity has interest in keeping jobs and business opportunities to 
be able to provide good services and prevent a decrease in inhabitants. If inhabitants and 
municipalities alike have the prospect of getting new opportunities when an area is conserved it 
is more likely that conservation will be more welcome and maybe even encouraged by the local 
community.    
The main aim of this Master’s thesis is to evaluate whether a local development trust fund (DTF) 
has fully compensated the affected municipalities for their net costs of the establishment of the 
Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve (TRNR), and whether this in turn is a preferred 
instrument to use from both the municipal and national perspective. My main hypothesis is that a 
development trust fund fully compensates the affected municipalities for their net costs of 
                                                 
3
 In Norwegian: “Næringsfond” or “Lokalt utviklingsfond” . In English: a “trust fund” where only returns are spent 
on local development. 
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establishing the TRNR. The hypothesis will be tested through an in medias res cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA); performed both at the local/municipality level and at the national level.  
The local CBA will explore the lost opportunities to the municipalities as a result of the 
conservation, and test if the DTF was large enough to compensate the municipalities for their 
loss. The national CBA will then investigate the benefits and costs at the national/social level and 
test if the benefits from the conservation are large enough to justify compensating the 
municipalities. Next the DTF will be evaluated and compared to alternative instruments. Finally, 
a policy recommendation based on the results of the analysis will be made.  
 
2 Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve (TRNR)4 
Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve (TRNR) was established in 2008 and is the largest 
forest reserve in Norway. It is located in Buskerud County, shared between the three 
municipalities Sigdal, Rollag and Nore og Uvdal. The process started in 1988-1990 when the 
first registrations of potential areas for conservation in a smaller part of the reserve were made. 
Over the years natural areas of high importance were discovered and documented  within the 
TRNR, and in 2002 an area of 43 km
2
 was conserved as what was called Trillemarka Nature 
Reserve (Friends of the Earth Norway, 2007). Close to this reserve an additional area of 2.5 km
2
 
called Heimseteråsen was also conserved at the same time. The same year Friends of the Earth 
Norway
5
 proposed to the Ministry of the Environment that an even larger area of a total 205 km
2
 
should be conserved in order to preserve the values in the forest in and around the existing 
reserve. This was the beginning of a long lasting conflict between environmental activists, the 
government, municipalities and forest owners.  
Several different suggestions for the size of the extended nature reserve were put forward by the 
different groups. The forest owners and municipalities promoted an area of 99 km
2
, the Ministry 
of the Environment asked for an evaluation of an area of 160 km
2
, while the environmental 
activists stuck to their opinion that 205 km
2
 had to be conserved to maintain the biodiversity 
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values. After years of pulling back and forth the conservation was enacted, resulting in 
Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell nature reserve with a total size of 148 km
2
.  
The most important restrictions for local actors in this case were that they were no longer 
allowed to top cut the forest nor build cabins. These aspects will be the main focus in calculating 
the local opportunity costs.  
 
3 Theory  
 In the grand scheme of it all the purpose of investigating the municipal costs of conservation and 
economic instruments for compensating the municipalities is to find out how biodiversity 
protection can be increased. It will be assumed that the local costs to conservation are larger than 
the social costs, and that this will lead to a market failure in the provision of biodiversity as a 
public good with positive externalities. Given that this is the case, the local costs needs to be 
recognized and compensated for in order to get an increase in biodiversity conservation, as 
shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. Stylized representation of how to increase biodiversity protection. MCL is local 
marginal cost of conservation; MCS represents social marginal cost of conservation. 
 
It is not assumed that compensating municipalities and forest owners is the only way to conserve 
biodiversity, but that it will work alongside other measures. The effect of local costs on 
biodiversity conservation will be isolated from the other measures, so that they can be analyzed 
as a part of the issue.  
This theory section will first go through the market failure caused by MCL  > MCS; then move on 
to the development trust fund as fiscal transfer; and then go on to assumptions behind the cost-
benefit analysis.     
Biodiversity 
protection 
too low 
Suspect 
MCL>MCS 
Conduct 
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local cost 
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Biodiversity 
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3.1 Market Failure 
When the local and national costs of conservation are different, the level of conservation will 
deviate from the socially optimal level, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2. Market failure when the local marginal cost of conserving biodiversity is higher than 
the social marginal cost; i.e. when MCL  > MCS, an area QL  will be conserved instead of the 
higher social optimal level of Q*.   
In Figure 3.2, Q* illustrates the optimal level of biodiversity conservation, which is where 
marginal social cost (MCs) is equal to marginal benefit (MB). Qmin represents the minimum of 
biodiversity necessary for human life. When approaching this limit marginal benefit is 
approaching infinity, as it is crucial for the existence of life. When local cost is higher than social 
cost the preservation of biodiversity will be lower than optimal, resulting in conservation at the 
point QL < Q*. To be able to reach the optimal level of conservation, the local actors can be 
compensated such that the level of conservation increases to Q*. This is of course a very 
simplified representation of the issue, but it serves to illustrate the point.   
The decision to conserve an area is often taken by the high level of government, while the costs 
of the decision are borne locally. In these cases land use has a different value locally than 
nationally. The local inhabitants do gain benefit from the conservation, but the benefit may not 
be large enough to compensate for the loss of the alternative use of the land.  
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It should be noted that the (static) optimal level of biodiversity conservation is here defined as 
marginal benefit being equal to marginal cost. This does not necessarily represent the level of 
biodiversity protection that is considered optimal from a ecological perspective (as pointed out in 
e.g. Pearce (2007)). One may or may not agree with this definition, but this is the premise behind 
the optimal provision of a public good in economics.  
According to Pearce and Moran (1994) market failures in biodiversity conservation occurs either 
at the global or at the local level. At the global level external benefits cross over national borders, 
where biodiversity loss in one country leads to a negative externality for other countries. At the 
local level the market failure manifests itself as a failure to account for the external cost of 
biodiversity loss, and an inability of the market to capture local and national benefits and costs of 
conservation. The latter is most relevant for the conservation in TRNR, so the local market 
failure will be the focus in this paper. In TRNR national goods are being preserved, but it seems 
unlikely that there are any global effects from this conservation (as we assume that most species 
in Norway can also be found in other northern boreal forests). Therefore, effects at the global 
level will not be considered here. 
 
3.2 Fiscal transfers 
Fiscal transfers in Norway are transfers between the central government, counties and 
municipalities. A development trust fund (DTF) is considered to be a fiscal transfer, and it will 
be compared to other instruments in terms of how well it is suited to compensate municipalities 
in conservation cases. To do this I will look to the guidelines presented by Boadway and Shah 
(2009) p. 352-353, which introduce a list of fifteen considerations for designing and analyzing 
fiscal transfers. I will not consider them all; only those who apply to the instruments and cause in 
this analysis.  
A grant should seek to preserve autonomy in the subnational government, leaving as much room 
for local decision making as possible. It should vary with fiscal needs to cause a fair distribution 
of the contribution from the citizens. The objectives of the grant should be simple and clearly 
specified to effectively reach targets.  Predictability is also key; allowing lower levels of 
government to plan around the transfer for longer periods of time. A grant program has to 
7 
 
consider the budget constraint, to set up for sustainable future use. Finally, there should be 
accountability for results, so the recipient of the grant should be able to show results from 
receiving it. These considerations will be used in the discussion of alternative instruments.  
The purpose of the development trust fund in the TRNR case was to compensate the 
municipalities and local community for their loss of business opportunities as a result of the 
conservation. In the guidelines for the fund it is stated that the funds shall be used to promote 
business development for the good of the inhabitants of the region (Sigdal Kommune, 2008). It 
can only give support to businesses that aim to generate profits and long term employment. 
Another condition is that it cannot be used for projects that a negative impact on endangered 
species or nature types in the area. Only the returns of the DTF are to be used, so that it benefits 
the local community on the long term.  
In terms of fiscal transfers the DTF can be seen as a conditional non-matching transfer from the 
government. According to Boadway and Shah (2009) this particular type of grant is well suited 
for the provision of goods that are of high priority to the higher level of government, but at a low 
level of priority to the lower level of government, just as is the case with biodiversity 
provisioning. Figure 3.3 shows the effects of a conditional non-matching grant on the 
municipalities’ budget line.  
 
Figure 3.3. The effect of a conditional non-matching transfer on the provisioning of a public 
good, shifting allocation from AB to CD. Graph adapted from Boadway and Shah (2009). 
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In receiving a DTF to compensate for their loss as a result of conservation, the municipalities can 
keep up their spending in other areas at the same time as providing more biodiversity protection. 
The welfare of the municipalities will be maximized, as their spending pattern can stay the same 
as before receiving the grant.  
 
3.3 Assumptions behind Cost-Benefit Analysis  
To examine the local costs of conservation, an in medias res cost-benefit analysis of the 
conservation of Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve on the local and national level will be 
conducted. In medias res means into the middle of things, and is a type of CBA that is used to 
analyze a project or policy while it is in effect. Since the conservation process is not yet finished 
and there are still losses and gains that are expected to accrue in the future this method is chosen. 
Before diving into the analysis, some assumptions about utility, discounting and time horizons 
will be made.  
 
3.3.1 Utility and Compensating Variation 
In a cost-benefit analysis one will conclude that if a project has a positive net present value (NPV) 
one should go through with it (Boardman, Greenberg, & Vining, 2011). To achieve this, the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion must be met, which means that the beneficiaries of the project must be 
able to compensate the cost inflicted parties and still be better off (i.e. total benefits must exceed 
total costs to achieve this potential Pareto improvement). Behind the Kaldor-Hicks criterion lays 
the concept of compensating variation, which is a measure that reflects utility change in 
monetary terms. Before looking closer into this, it is appropriate to state a few assumptions about 
the utility functions used in the CBA at both the local and national (social) level.     
At the local level the municipalities are assumed to be utility maximizing actors with a utility 
function depending on their income and expenditure. The municipal income, Y, consists of labor 
tax, real estate tax, municipal fees and transfers from the government. Expenditure, E, represents 
the costs of providing services to the inhabitants.   
   (  (                    )  ), where  
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It is assumed that the municipalities’ utility functions display homothetic preferences, which 
implies that their income elasticity is equal to one. Realistically this assumption is questionable, 
but according to theory it is a necessary property for the correct use of compensating variation 
(Boardman et al., 2011 p. 77). 
It is assumed that forest conservation leads to a decrease in income tax, real estate tax and 
municipal fees. This means that the municipality will have a decreased utility, as their income is 
decreasing while expenditure remains unchanged. This is analogue to the forest owners having 
their utility reduced when they cannot use their forests as before. For the municipality to have the 
same utility as before the change, they will have to be compensated for their loss. Assuming that 
the municipalities had an initial utility of   , the following condition would have to be fulfilled: 
  (             )      (        ) 
Where    is the initial utility level,    is the initial income,    and   is the possible forest use 
before and after conservation respectively and WTA is the willingness to accept. Going from    
to    implies a reduction in possibilities for the municipalities. The payment that the 
municipalities are willing to accept has to be such that the utility level stays the same as before 
the conservation of the forest. The equivalent variation counterpart to this would be if the 
municipalities were asked how much they would be willing to pay to not have the forest 
conserved; knowing that if they did not pay the conservation would take place. Assuming that 
the municipalities have a utility of    post potential conservation the following condition must 
then be fulfilled:  
  (             )      (        )  
The municipalities are here paying to avoid the disutility of having the forest conserved. They 
would here be indifferent between giving up a sum corresponding to the willingness to pay from 
their income and having the forest conserved. If they have disutility from forest conservation 
their WTP must be positive in order to fulfill the condition.   
Compensating and equivalent variation can also be used when looking at the change in the utility 
of the national population from increased protection of biodiversity. In the CBA at the national 
level, results from a Contingent Valuation survey will be used to illustrate the benefit of 
10 
 
increased biodiversity conservation. The survey investigated the use and conservation of forests, 
in which a representative sample of Norwegian households were asked how much they would be 
willing to pay to have a certain part of the productive forest in Norway conserved. The 
compensating variation for this will be shown by the WTP when the following equation holds: 
  (            )      (        )  
If the increase in conservation leads to a higher utility for the respondent she/he would have to 
give up a part of her/his income to be at the same utility as before the change. Assuming that the 
stated willingness to pay is the true willingness to pay
6
, the social welfare increase from the 
conservation can be monetized through the willingness to pay. Corresponding to the municipality 
example, this case also has an equivalent variation counterpart where the following condition 
must be fulfilled: 
  (            )      (        )  
Here the question would be: Given that we are not going to conserve the forest, how much would 
you accept in compensation to have the same utility after not making the change. The 
respondents would then have to state their willingness to accept, knowing that the forest will not 
be protected and they will have to forego the corresponding potential utility increase. To have as 
high a utility as they could have had with the conservation they would need to receive a sum 
corresponding to their WTA.   
Assuming homothetic preferences are even more problematic for households in the CV survey 
than for the municipalities, as their preferences for different goods are quite unlikely to have an 
income elasticity of one. An environmental good like biodiversity can be regarded as a luxury 
good and hence have an income elasticity of demand larger than one, since being willing to pay 
for it takes priority after necessary goods such as food and housing. But as Mäler and Vinent 
(2005 p. 909) points out this is defined through the income elasticity of demand and not through 
the income elasticity of WTP. Empirical estimates of the link between the elasticity of demand 
and WTP shows that the elasticity of WTP varies in size and even sign when compared to the 
                                                 
6
 As will be shown when calculating the benefits in the CBAs, this is not necessarily the case; protest bids, biases.  
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elasticity of demand (Flores & Carson, 1997). The assumption of homothetic preferences still 
needs to be upheld for the validity of compensating variation.      
Compensating variation can be seen as a necessary proxy to be able to capture the unobservable 
utility changes in monetary terms to be used in a CBA. As with any proxy it cannot be expected 
to correctly represent every aspect of the variable it is supposed to replace. In some cases the 
uncertainty of the proxy makes it better to omit the utility change from the calculation and rather 
describe the change qualitatively. 
    
3.3.2 Use and Non-use Values 
The total economic value (TEV) of a marginal change in quality or quantity of environmental 
goods such as biodiversity can be divided into two main categories; use and non-use values 
(Pearce, Atkinson, & Mourato, 2006). The use value reflects the actual, planned or potential use 
of the good in question, such as visiting the forest, berry picking or hunting. The potential use is 
the option value of a good, meaning that there is a value in having the option to use the good 
sometime in the future. The non-use value is based on a utility from simply knowing that the 
good exists or is being provided without having any plans of using the good itself. The non-use 
value can be divided into bequest values, altruistic values and existence values (Pearce et al., 
2006). A bequest value is a willingness to pay for a good to be available to future generations, 
while altruistic value reflects a utility from knowing that other people in the same generation can 
enjoy the good. The existence value is the WTP to keep a good even if it is not used by anyone, 
reflecting that the good has an intrinsic value.  
The public right of access
7
 makes it possible to enjoy the use value of nature in Norway even 
when the forest is owned privately. This means that the use values of a forest are not necessarily 
increasing when an area is conserved. Only if the establishment of the nature reserve resulted in 
an increase in planned or actual visits, that was not the result of a decrease in visits somewhere 
else, we could say that we have an increase in use value.   
                                                 
7
 In Norwegian: Allemannsretten.  
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In practice these use and non-use values can be difficult to monetize. Different valuation 
methods have been designed to capture these values, both through revealed and stated preference 
techniques. However, only stated preference methods are able to capture non-use values. There 
are disagreements among economists about the validity of these methods, especially regarding 
stated preference techniques used to capture non-use values. For a discussion on this see e.g. 
Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012); Hausman (2012) and Carson (2012). In this analysis results 
based on the stated preference technique contingent valuation is used to estimate the benefit of 
the establishment of TRNR. This is described more closely in the section “Willingness to Pay for 
Conserving Forest Biodiversity”.  
In this thesis the main focus is on biodiversity, but there are also other ecosystem services the 
forest provides that are not included in this analysis, for instance carbon sequestration. 
Conservation of forests preserves carbon stocks, which would have a positive effect in the short 
term, but in the long term the effect is uncertain (Framstad et al., 2013 p. 77). The uncertainties 
about the effects of many ecosystem services make them difficult to include in a CBA. There 
could also be an issue with double counting when including both biodiversity and other 
ecosystem services, as biodiversity is a regulator for ecosystem processes that support other 
ecosystem services (Mace, Norris, & Fitter, 2012). 
  
3.3.3 Net Present Value (NPV) 
Benefits and costs often occur at different times during a project/policy. To be able to compare 
these costs and benefits across time they are discounted to the present value of the set reference 
year using a discount rate. When all costs and benefits across time are taken into account we can 
calculate the net present value (NPV) of a project.  
        ∑
     
(   ) 
 
   
   
Where I is investment, t is time,    is benefit at time t,    is cost at time t and r is the discount 
rate. Instead of being constant, the discount rate   will be declining over time; based on the 
reasoning in the next section.  
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3.3.4 Discounting 
The discount rate has a large impact on the result of a cost-benefit analysis through its effect on 
the net present value (NPV). A high positive discount rate puts more weight on the costs and 
benefits occurring in the near future, as costs and benefits in the far future get discounted to a 
low present value. Assume that a person living in the future, say 100 years from now, has a WTP 
of 1000 NOK to preserve a set area for biodiversity conservation. With a discount rate of five 
percent that WTP would be reduced to only 7.6 NOK in present value. In comparison the same 
WTP would be worth 138 NOK today with a discount rate of two percent. In both cases there is a 
sharp decrease in present value, but there is a large difference between the effects of the two 
discount rates when evaluating the outcome of the conservation project. This underlines the 
importance of the choice of discount rate. The following will briefly go through the 
interpretations of discount rates and argue that a declining discount rate is appropriate for 
projects with a long time horizon. 
There are two main interpretations of the discount rate, one is based on consumption and the 
other is market based.  
In the consumption based interpretation a consumer will make an investment if the future return 
is larger than the loss in benefit from forgoing consumption today. Following common 
assumptions about the consumer
8
, this will be satisfied through the Ramsey rule (Harrison, 2010): 
           
Where   is the discount rate,   is the pure rate of social time preference,   is the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption and   is the growth rate in consumption. Future utility is 
discounted through  , which reflects impatience. A high   represents a high degree of preference 
towards spending today rather than later. The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,  , is 
the percentage decrease in marginal utility when consumption is increased by one percent. The 
principles of the Ramsey rule are commonly agreed upon, but there are large differences in what 
is perceived as the “right” magnitude of the parameters. Harrison (2010) provides an overview 
where estimates of the discount rate range from 1.4 percent up to 8 percent using the Ramsey 
rule.  
                                                 
8
 Assuming a consumer with a constant relative risk averse utility function.  
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In the market based interpretation of the discount rate the expected rate of return on an asset 
consists of a risk free rate of return in the capital market and an additional risk premium that is 
specific to the investment (NOU 2012:16). This is described through the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and is given by the following condition: 
        (    )  
Where   is the optimal rate of return,    is the risk free return, R is the expected return of the 
portfolio as a whole and   is the covariation between the return of the asset and the return of the 
total portfolio. The CAPM model was previously used to calculate the discount rate for CBAs in 
Norway, but has been critiqued for lacking relevance to public investments.   
There are large uncertainties about future macroeconomic development and the size of yields 
from investments made today. The Norwegian guidelines for CBAs, NOU 2012:16, takes this 
into account by referring to a contribution by Weitzman (2012), which suggests that whenever 
there are projects where the systematic risk is smaller than the average market risk, the risk 
adjusted interest rate will decline over time. Weitzman (2012) bases his analysis around the 
CAPM, but changes the underlying assumptions. The static CAPM is built upon preferences that 
are defined by expected variance, while the Weitzman model is built upon assumptions of a 
constant relative risk averse utility function (NOU 2012:16). In the context of biodiversity, a 
constant relative risk averse utility function is consistent with the precautionary principle. There 
are large uncertainties about what effects biodiversity loss can have in the future, but we know 
there are possibilities of large economic and ecological losses. The underlying utility function 
makes it possible to interpret the result of the model as a dynamic generalization of the CAPM. 
In the model the optimal rate of return is defined by the beta weighted average of the return of a 
safe investment and the mean return of a representative risky investment. The optimal risk 
adjusted interest rate is given by:  
     
 
 
  ((   )             )  
Where    is the optimal discount rate, t represents time,   is the correlation between the projects’ 
contribution to net benefit and total consumption,    is the rate of return on a safe investment and 
   is the rate of return on a risky investment. By inserting values for the parameters   ,   and   
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the interest rate over time can be plotted, and we can see that it is declining over time. As 
displayed in Figure 3.4 the risk adjusted discount rate approaches the risk free discount rate over 
time. The parameter values are the same as the example used in Bye and Hagen (2013).  
 
Figure 3.4. Declining discount rate over time using Weitzman’s model. r_f = 2%, r_e= 7% and 
β= 0.5. 
 
There are many uncertainties regarding the size of the parameters going into the Weitzman 
declining discount rate. I therefore chose to use the recommended stepwise declining discount 
rate from the Norwegian guidelines on CBAs for the calculations instead, using the assumptions 
in the Weitzman model as the reasoning for using a declining discount rate. For the first 40 years 
the discount rate is 4 %, from years 40-75 it declines to 3 % and from years 75-100 it declines to 
the assumed risk free rate of 2 %, which are corresponding to the guidelines (NOU 2012:16). 
 
3.3.5 Time Horizon 
When an area is conserved and stays conserved throughout time the benefits of biodiversity is 
reaped by several generations. The time horizon is set in order to reflect this aspect. In view of 
taking biodiversity conservation into account one should ideally have set the time horizon such 
that the costs and benefits go to infinity. At the same time the development in the economy 
becomes decreasingly predictable the further into the future we look. As a compromise between 
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these two conditions a time horizon of 100 years was chosen for the main analysis. Sensitivity 
analysis on the time horizon will be performed, to see if it can have an altering effect on the 
results.  
 
3.4 A Note on Estimations 
The cost and benefit estimates are based on references and datasets from different years. All 
costs and benefits are therefore transformed to 2008 price level using the consumer price index, 
as 2008 is used as the base year of the analysis. It should be noted that using the consumer price 
index to transform prices across years could lead to some errors, as the price development of the 
different goods valued does not necessarily follow the CPI. On the other hand using the CPI to 
index all prices provides a consistency in the price transformation, which here is considered to be 
better than dealing with the uncertainties of forecasting price developments.  
   
4 Local Cost-Benefit Analysis  
The main cost-benefit analysis in this thesis is from the local perspective, as opposed to being at 
the national level. The local level analysis will take into account local costs that are incurred by 
the municipalities, mainly lost tax revenue and lost business opportunities in logging and cabin 
building. In the national CBA these costs is not taken into account, as it is assumed that actors in 
other municipalities will replace the reduced supply from the TRNR municipalities, and it will 
not be considered a loss.  
The main purpose of the local CBA will be to test if the development trust fund compensates the 
municipalities for their costs. The fund had a total size of 30 million NOK, which was meant to 
compensate all three municipalities for their lost opportunities. Prior to the decision about the 
size of the fund, the municipalities had suggested that 100 million NOK was an appropriate sum, 
which was also supported by the opposition parties. The analysis will investigate which sum is 
closer to the estimated costs.  
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The municipal costs that are valued in the analysis are tax loss from foregone forestry, loss 
related to reduced cabin building activity and administration costs. The benefits are based on 
willingness to pay for conservation, where the benefits to the inhabitants of the municipality will 
be counted. 
There are mainly four groups that have been affected by, and involved in, the conservation; 
forest owners, municipalities, environmental activists and the government. Even if a CBA seems 
to follow objective criteria there are many choices that can affect the results. In order for the 
reader to make up her/his mind on how to interpret the outcomes, the results will be divided into 
scenarios that are beneficial for different actors. In Table 4.1 below, the four groups are sorted 
after their preference for different outcomes of the scenario.  
Table 4.1. Interests of different groups sorted after high and low scenarios for each part of the 
CBA, given that compensation of costs will be made. 
 Low  High Indifferent 
Timber tax loss Government, activists Municipalities, forest 
owners 
 
Potential cabin building Government Municipalities, forest 
owners, activists  
 
WTP for conservation Municipalities, forest 
owners 
Government, activists  
Development trust fund Government Municipalities, forest 
owners 
Activists 
Administration cost Government, 
municipalities 
 Activists, forest 
owners 
 
The activists are assumed to value nature higher than the rest of the population, and will in every 
case prefer the alternative that gives the highest probability of conservation. The government is 
also assumed to be pro conservation, but unlike the activists they have to consider their budget 
constraint and will try to minimize their costs. The municipalities are assumed to be reluctant to 
conserve, as business opportunities and tax income will disappear. Forest owners are assumed to 
be even more reluctant than the municipalities, since they will have to give up their land with all 
its opportunities and the aspirations they had for its future use.  
In Table 4.1 there are some surprising combinations, such as the cabin building scenario where 
proponents and opponents of conservation are on the same side. The municipalities and forest 
18 
 
owners will try to get compensated for their loss and will hence claim that a high number of 
potential cabins could have been built, while the activists will agree to this with the reasoning 
that conservation is necessary to avoid damage to nature from the building. The government will 
agree with the activists on the potential damage, but since they will have to compensate for the 
loss they want to portray a low number of cabins.   
It should be noted that the different actors have not acted according to how it is assumed in Table 
4.1 throughout the whole conservation process. Some of them changed their strategies as the 
process progressed, when some options fell through and others came up. In cabin building for 
instance, the forest owners and municipalities first had an interest in saying that the number of 
potential new cabins were low, to project that they were capable of taking care of the nature 
values in the area in hope of avoiding conservation. Later, when the conservation was likely to 
happen, their incentives changed, as the number of cabins could indicate their loss in revenue 
and business opportunity.  
 
4.1 The Municipal Tax Effect of Reduced Forestry 
The establishment of Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve made all forestry in the area 
prohibited. The forest owners received compensation for not being allowed to use the forest for 
logging, but the municipalities also have a loss in income from this through not being able to 
collect any tax revenue from forestry in the area. This section will explain how this loss was 
calculated and present estimates for the magnitude of the loss.  
In Norway most forest owners are managing their forest as a sole proprietorship (Statistics 
Norway, 2013a), and according to Kjell Ove Hovde, the forest manager in Sigdal municipality 
(Hovde, 2013)  most forest owners in the area ran their business in this way before the 
conservation process started. When an individual is running a sole proprietorship the taxable 
proportion of the income from the business is counted as a part of the individual’s personal 
income. The municipalities’ tax loss will therefore be based on the estimated income from 
forestry for the TRNR area. Three scenarios will be presented, where the main alternative is 
between a low and a high estimate to be able to capture the range in which the results could lie.   
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Obtaining the tax payment from forestry for each forest owner in the TRNR case has some 
difficulty attached to it. There are many individual effects on each person’s tax payments, such 
as debt, number of children, primary income etc., making it difficult to estimate the true tax 
payments for them as a group. Another issue is that income from forestry for each individual 
owner comes in cycles, since parts of the forest that are planted at the same time also get cut at 
the same time in the future. Forest owners can smooth out their income from one year over five 
years to avoid disproportionally high taxation in high income years. To take these issues into 
account using statistics seems most accurate to capture the expected future tax loss for the 
municipalities. After consulting with representatives from local and national tax authorities, 
forest owners and Statistics Norway (SSB), the following two methods seems to be the 
estimation that is most accurate.     
In the first method, which is the basis for the main scenario, statistics covering Norwegian forest 
owners’ income from forestry sorted by property size (Statistics Norway, 2013c) has been used 
in combination with information on the property size of each forest owner to estimate the tax loss 
of the municipalities.
9
 First the income data was transformed into the price level of one set base 
year using the consumer price index, and then the average income for the different intervals of 
areas was calculated. This number was then matched with data on forest owner compensation to 
find the average annual income for each property size. Finally the average municipal tax was 
calculated for each forest owner using an assumed tax percentage of 12 percent, which is based 
on the municipal tax percentage over the past five years
10
.  
The data on compensation of forest owners was obtained through Svein Ekanger, who is the 
forest expert representing the forest owners in TRNR. This data is not yet available to the public 
since the case is still open, and it is possible to recognize the forest owners based on the size and 
characteristics of the property. Due to the confidentiality of the data material I cannot list the size, 
compensations and estimated tax loss for all forest owners, but I will provide an example on how 
the tax estimation was made in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.   
                                                 
9
 See Table 11.1 in Appendix C for details.  
10
 The part of the tax percentage from income that go to the municipalities changes every year with the government 
budget, during the past five years from 2007-2012 it has been varying between 11.3 percent and 12.8 percent 
(Norwegian Government, 2007-2012). 
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Table 4.2. Calculation of tax loss for forest owner R-63, taking area of property into account. 
Forest owner 
code 
Productive 
forest area (in 
daa) 
Estimated 
average income 
per year for 
this area size 
Municipal tax 
rate 
Estimated tax 
R-63 574 32,982 0.12 3,958 
 
To test the validity of this estimate, a tax estimation based on the actual compensation payments 
to the forest owners was conducted (with the same tax rate)
11
. The compensation payments are 
reflecting the value of the forest, which should be quite similar to the expected income found in 
the statistics for the estimate to be close to its true value. The net present value of the estimations 
turned out to be quite similar; the estimation based on statistics generated a tax loss of 9.2 
million NOK, while the estimation based on compensation payments generated a tax loss of 9.6 
million NOK.  
It should be noted that the compensation payments from the forest expert were calculated with an 
infinite time horizon and a five percent discount rate, so the two numbers are not directly 
comparable (considering that the estimation based on statistics has a declining discount rate and 
a time horizon of 100 years). Since the time horizon is longer in the calculation based on the 
compensation payments, this would reflect a loss over a longer period of time, which naturally 
would be larger than a loss over a shorter period of time. However, since there is a relatively 
high discount rate on the calculations of compensation payments, payments made more than 100 
years from now has a relatively small present value compared to the estimations with a declining 
discount rate. This makes the effect of the difference in time horizon smaller.    
In the second method, which is used for the high scenario, statistics on forest owners’ average 
income from forestry in Buskerud County (Statistics Norway, 2013b) is multiplied with the 
number of forest owners affected. The main difference from the first method is that the size of 
the property is not taken into account and that this data represents the county of Buskerud, and 
                                                 
11
 I also tried to compare the estimates to information on the annual tax income from forestry to municipalities, but 
this information was not possible to obtain during the time the thesis was written, see Appendix C for details.   
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not the whole country
12
. For the same forest owner used in the previous example the estimated 
tax loss with this method is higher, which is a trend for most of the other forest owners as well.  
Table 4.3. Calculation of tax loss for forest owner R-63,not taking area of property into account. 
Forest owner code Estimated average 
income for forest 
owners in Buskerud 
owning areas larger 
than 25 daa 
Municipal tax rate Estimated tax 
R-63 44545 
 
0.12 5,345 
 
 
This alternative seems to predict quite high estimates for potential loss when comparing them to 
the compensation payments to the forest owners.  
 
4.1.1 Effect of Falling Timber Price  
The price of timber is very volatile, fluctuating a lot from one year to the next. There has been a 
trend of decreasing real timber prices over a long period of time. To capture this trend the 
compound annual growth rate has been calculated based on available statistics on the average 
timber price. Using this method it was found that during the years from 1965-2011
13
 the timber 
price (P) has had a negative growth rate of about two percent per year:  
(
     
     
)
 
 
    (
   
   
)
 
  
            
For the lowest estimate of the timber tax loss, the foregone tax income to the municipalities has a 
negative growth of two percent to reflect the forecast about timber prices. If this trend continues 
over the years this affects the forest owner’s forgone income and hence also the tax income of 
the municipalities from forestry. Assuming that one can use this previous trend to forecast the 
future timber price, the net present value of the forgone tax revenue of the municipalities will be 
reduced. This will be the assumption behind the lowest estimate of lost tax revenue.  
                                                 
12
 See Table 11.2 in Appendix C for the distribution in size of forest properties for TRNR, Buskerud County and 
Norway as a whole.  
13
 See Table 11.3 in Appendix C for the data set this is based on.  
22 
 
One should be careful about forecasting into the future using the real growth rate from previous 
years, as there are other factors that could affect the timber price in the future. In the far future 
we could for instance see an increase in the timber price as a result of scarcity. The value of 
timber could also increase as a result of the value of carbon storage.  
The foregone tax revenue for all the municipalities together in the main scenario is estimated to 
be 289,430 NOK per year. Over the course of 100 years this results in a net present value of 9.2 
million NOK. In the lowest estimate, where the decline in timber price has been included, the 
NPV is 5.4 million NOK, while the highest estimate yields a NPV of 15.5 million NOK. The 
result is displayed in Figure 4.1 below.  
 
Figure 4.1. The net present value of low, medium and high scenarios for tax loss in forestry over 
a time horizon of 100 years. 
 
The low scenario would be supported by the government since they are trying to minimize their 
costs. The environmental activists would also go for this scenario, as it is in their interest to 
claim that the market value of timber in the area is low. The municipalities and the forest owners 
on the other hand would support the high scenario, as this would maximize their compensation.  
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4.2 Loss from Foregone Cabin Building      
Both forest owners and municipalities have pointed towards the opportunity of building cabins as 
an important use of land. The conservation prevents any further building activities in and in the 
peripheral zone around the reserve. All the municipalities have a high concentration of cabins; 
there are more than twice as many cabins as households in all three municipalities (Institute of 
Transport Economics, 2013 ,section “hyttetetthet og betydning”). This is a very important source 
of income and economic growth for the municipalities. The varied nature in and around TRNR 
makes it well suited for cabin sites. The closeness to larger cities and towns in the adjacent 
counties also makes it an attractive location (County Governor of Buskerud, 2005).   
To find the effect of foregone cabin opportunities data from the Institute of Transport 
Economics
14
 has been used. In a rapport on the impacts of tourism in Buskerud County Farstad 
and Dybedal (2011) presents findings that include the effects of private cabins on the local 
economy. These findings will be used in combination with estimates on the magnitude of cabin 
building. It is assumed that these cabins would have been built in addition to other cabins outside 
the reserve. For the municipalities Sigdal and Rollag this is a realistic assumption, since the 
reserve is taking up large areas within the municipal borders. For Nore og Uvdal on the other 
hand, it is more likely that other alternative locations for cabin building would be more important, 
as the part of the reserve that lies within Nore og Uvdal is quite small and the size of the rest of 
the municipality is relatively large.  
 
4.2.1 Land Use Regulation  
Before getting into the scenarios in potential cabin building a note on land use regulations is in 
order. Every municipality must have a municipal master plan
15
, which consists of a community 
element and a land-use element (NOU 2009:16, p.24). This plan will, inter alia, give an overview 
of areas set off for building and future development. Based on the municipal master plan a 
zoning plan
16
 is made, which in detail will describe land use in the area. When the area is 
approved for building in the zoning plan, a building permit must be obtained before any building 
                                                 
14
 In Norwegian: Transportøkonomisk Institutt  
15
 In Norwegian: Kommuneplan 
16
In Norwegian: Reguleringsplan 
24 
 
can commence. This is relevant for the prediction on how many cabins potentially could have 
been built in the area that is now conserved. Appendix A provides a map displaying the zoning 
plans in the TRNR area before conservation.  
        
4.2.2 Magnitude 
An estimate of number of cabins that potentially could have been built in the area is necessary to 
find the effects of forgone income for the local community. Before the conservation was a fact a 
local newspaper reported that one of the municipalities were planning on building 1100 new 
cabins in and around the area that was considered for conservation (Moen, 2003). The numbers 
were taken from suggestions made in a municipal master plan. The newspaper article argued that 
one could not trust the forest owners and municipalities to protect the biodiversity in the area 
when there were extensive plans for cabin building. 
Friends of the Earth Norway used the newspaper article to argue that conservation was a 
necessary step to take. They also made calculations suggesting that up to 2000 cabins were 
planned, when taking into account suggestions in municipal master plans from all three 
municipalities (Friends of the Earth Norway, 2003, 2006)
17
. Politicians in the municipalities 
contended that these plans were from before the conservation process started, and that they had 
discarded them at the time when the article was published, claiming that Friends of the Earth 
Norway were presenting false information (Ekholdt, 2006). This was refuted by the conservation 
proponents, saying that the plans were only temporarily put on hold while conservation was 
considered (Friends of the Earth Norway, 2006).  
It should be noted that the numbers quoted above are referring to the environmental activists’ 
proposal of an area of 200 km
2
, which was larger than the one that ended up being conserved 
(148 km
2
). The whole area of TRNR is now 148 km
2
, but the conservation that took place in 
2008 was as mentioned above an expansion of an already existing area of 43 km
2
, making the 
addition to the conservation 105 km
2
.  
                                                 
17
 Articles and email correspondence with Harald Baardset, the leader of Friends of the Earth Sigdal and Modum.  
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Even if the numbers from the newspaper were suggested in municipality master plans and they 
were referring to a larger area than what ended up being conserved, it is unlikely that such a 
large number of cabins would pass zoning plans and be allowed to be built in an area considered 
for conservation. A more conservative estimate can be provided by statistics on the average 
number of cabins per km
2
 in each municipality, as displayed in Table 4.4 below.   
Table 4.4.Average number of cabins per km2 in Buskerud County and the municipalities of 
Sigdal, Rollag and Nore og Uvdal( in 2008), and the projected total number of cabins in the area 
covered by TRNR (Institute of Transport Economics, 2013). 
 Buskerud Sigdal Rollag Nore og Uvdal 
Cabins per km
2
  3.05 4.93 3.99 1.63 
Multiplied with 
area of TRNR 
(105 km
2
) 
320 518 419 171 
 
The main alternative is based on the data above, and is assumed to be an average number of 
cabins per km
2
 of all three municipalities combined, which corresponds to 369 cabins for the 
area under investigation. This assumes that the conserved area is as appropriate for cabin 
building as the average area in each of the municipalities. Similar to the calculation of forestry 
tax loss, two alternatives (low and high estimate of the main alternative) will also be presented to 
allow for different views. 
At the time when the conservation plan process first started there were zoning plans for the 
building of 108 cabins within the area considered for conservation. But the regulation had not 
been fully approved at the time when the conservation process started, so these plans were halted 
(County Governor of Buskerud, 2005). It will be assumed that these plans would have been 
implemented if the area had not been conserved, as the planning process had already started and 
had been implemented in the zoning plan. This will be set as the smallest alternative within the 
estimation of lost revenue from cabin building. The largest alternative is set to be 500 cabins, 
representing the earlier mentioned number from the newspaper article, taking into account the 
size of the area that was actually conserved.  
It is assumed that the municipalities will have an income loss as a result of reduced property tax, 
municipal fees and tax on local labor being used for cabin building. Farstad and Dybedal (2011) 
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reports that, on average, there is a local labor cost of 306,629 NOK per cabin being built in 
Buskerud County. For the municipal fees and property tax the numbers are taken from Rollag 
municipality, which has a property tax of 0.25 percent of the value of the property and municipal 
fees of 875 per year (correspondence with Olaug Tveiten from Rollag municipality). The 
estimated loss from this is calculated and displayed in Table 4.5.  
In the calculation of foregone revenue from property tax and municipal fees the hypothetical 
building of new cabins is spread out over time to reflect that not all cabins are likely to be built at 
the same time. It is assumed that the first 108 cabins would have been built quickly, as they were 
already approved in the zoning plan. To avoid overestimating the gains from cabin building and 
to simulate a real life building situation, it is assumed that the amount of cabins in the medium 
and high scenario is increasing over time. This adjustment is also made to take into account that 
Sigdal municipality does not have a property tax, trying not to overvalue the effect of cabin 
building. In the medium alternative it is assumed that about 50 extra cabins are built every 10 
years until year 50 where 261 additional cabins have been built. In the high alternative the same 
procedure is used, but here the building stops in year 80, when 392 additional cabins have been 
built compared to the initial level.  
Table 4.5. Estimated income loss to municipalities for different scenarios of potential cabin 
building in TRNR. 
 Low  Medium High 
Assumed amount of 
cabins  
108 369 500 
NPV of tax loss from 
local labor (one-time 
loss) 
3,973,912 13,577,532 18,397,749 
NPV of tax loss from 
property tax and 
municipal fees 
13,036,037 
 
27,570,311 
 
30,064,874 
 
  
4.2.3 Increased Value from Conservation?  
If locating a cabin in the vicinity of a nature reserve is significantly increasing the price of the 
cabin, there could be a potential for both the land owners and the municipalities to earn their lost 
revenue as a result of the conservation. This economic value could have been estimated using the 
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Hedonic Price method or expert assessments by real estate brokers.  There has been a political 
focus on using preserved areas in order to promote tourism in rural areas (Heiberg, Christensen, 
Haaland, & Aas, 2006). This is an argument that has been used in favor of conservation.   
Heiberg et al. (2006) has examined the price effect on cabin prices from being close to areas with 
nature conservation, and found that it was difficult to prove a significant effect on the price. A 
sample of real estate brokers were asked to consider several factors determining the price of 
cabins. Some believed that advertising closeness to a conserved area would make a cabin’s 
location more attractive, but that it is difficult to distinguish this effect from the other 
characteristics of the location of the cabin.  
The main result from Heiberg et al. (2006) was that one could not see any effect on cabin prices 
from being in the vicinity of a conservation area. Despite these results the report points out that 
the demand for a more quiet and secluded cabin experience might get increasingly more 
attractive in the future. At present most new cabins are built in large cabin sites rather than in 
more private locations. The potential scarcity of more secluded cabins might lead to a significant 
positive price effect of the large untouched areas that a nature reserve or a nature park can 
provide.  
An article in the newspaper Laagendalsposten (Nordahl, 2010) reports that forest owners that 
previously were opposed to the conservation are now using Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell Nature 
Reserve as an attraction in promoting cabins in a secluded environment. They believe that the 
existence of the nature reserve has a positive effect on sales. This could be a sign of the 
predictions from Heiberg et al. (2006) coming true, but there is not enough evidence to claim this. 
  
4.2.4 A Note on Law 
Even if the forest owners and municipalities could forecast their loss of not being able to build 
cabins in the conserved area, like this analysis has done, they would not be entitled to any 
compensation according to The Law of Nature Conservation and The Nature Diversity Act
18
. In 
§ 50 of the Nature Diversity Act (Naturmangfoldloven, 2009) it is stated that in cases where 
                                                 
18
 The Law of Nature Conservation was the current jurisdiction at the time of the conservation of TRNR. It was 
replaced by the Nature Diversity Act as of June 19th 2009.   
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permission from an authority is required for land use, the right to receive compensation only 
apply when the permit is given before the announcement of the conservation. This means that 
one cannot claim compensation based on the possibility of building something in the future. In 
The Law of Nature Conservation, which was the current law during the conservation of TRNR, 
this was less strictly formulated, but any compensation for this was rare.  
 
4.3 Administrative Costs  
The administration of the nature reserve is delegated to the municipalities, which have 
established a post within Nore og Uvdal municipality for management of the reserve. During the 
past years they have incurred the following costs:  
Table 4.6. Administrative costs from management of the TRNR from the year of establishment 
until the present (Jaren, 2013). 
 Administrator 
position 
Environmental 
Measures 
Management plan 
2009 657,084 43,937 30,862 
2010 1,279,799 248,852 561,648 
2011 858,874 220,022 317,633 
2012 891,036 6,428 138,860 
Sum 3,686,793 519,239 1,049,003 
 
The administration costs so far have been covered by grants from the government and there has 
been no extra cost to the municipalities for this. The grants have been 2,000,000 for management 
planning (one-time grant), 1,000,000 (5 year grant) to cover environmental measures and 
1,000,000 per year for administrative positions. The left over grants are put into a fund for later 
use (Jaren, 2013). The future funding for administration is yet to be determined; the 
municipalities are in dialogue with the Ministry of the Environment to get a long term contract. 
According to the reserve administrator, Hege Jaren, the municipalities are expecting the annual 
funding to continue as it has up until now. In the analysis, the assumed administration costs are 
therefore estimated to be 1,000,000 NOK (in 2008 NOK) per year as of 2013.   
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4.4 Recreation 
Recreational activities such as fishing, hunting and picking of berry/mushroom picking is still 
allowed within the nature reserve, so there is no loss in this respect. But restrictions in 
transportation and accommodation might lead to a reduction in these activities. Another effect 
that may contribute to less recreation is the fact that old growth forests with dead wood are hard 
to maneuver around, making it less attractive recreationally. At the same time the feeling of 
wilderness and knowing that nature is well taken care of has the opposite effect. This is 
supported by Gundersen and Aasetre (2008  p. 22), which found that people prefer forests with 
high trees and varied vegetation. A positive effect may come from the reserve’s relative 
closeness to the capital of Oslo and the surrounding areas, which are densely populated by 
Norwegian standards.     
 
4.5 Willingness to Pay for Conserving Forest Biodiversity 
Many of the benefits from nature conservation are yet to be measured in monetary terms. An 
ongoing project is evaluating valuation of ecosystem services in Norway (Ministry of the 
Environment, 2013), but so far there are no results available to be used in CBAs. Since there is 
no market for biodiversity we cannot observe the prices. An environmental valuation study is in 
this respect useful in trying to capture the willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation; see 
Stenger, Navrud, and Harou (2009) for a review of non-timber benefits from forests and 
valuation methods to assess their economic value. 
The optimal solution would be to make a survey to ask respondents their willingness to pay 
(WTP) for conserving the area Trillemarka-Rollagsfjell, but the timeframe of this thesis did not 
allow for this. It is therefore necessary to perform benefit transfer of values from an existing 
survey.  
There are two ways of performing a benefit transfer, one can either do a unit transfer or a 
function transfer (Navrud, 2010; Riera et al., 2012). Unit transfers are split into simple unit 
transfers and unit transfer with income adjustments. A simple unit transfer is simply transferring 
the mean value of estimated benefit from one study to another, without making any alterations to 
the value. This is appropriate when the standards of living and income levels are similar in the 
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study site and the policy site. One will here assume that the wellbeing of the average person 
being surveyed is representative of the wellbeing of those in the policy site.  
If there are large differences between the study site and the policy site one can use a unit transfer 
with income adjustments, by adjusting the value with Purchasing Power Parities (PPP). When 
doing this one should be aware that PPP adjustment does not account for all differences that may 
affect the estimates, there might for instance be cultural and institutional differences that is not 
captured by the transformation (Navrud, 2010).  
In a function transfer the value function from a study site is transferred to the policy site, keeping 
the dependent variable (in this case WTP for the good in question) the same as in the study site 
while the explanatory variables are replaced by those on the policy site. This requires data on the 
explanatory variables on the policy site, combined with a value function that has a sufficient 
degree of explanatory power. One could also use a meta-analysis for this purpose, where results 
from several surveys are combined into one function.  
A function transfer takes more information into account in the transfer, and could in this way be 
preferred over a unit transfer. However, it is not yet established that a function transfer 
significantly reduces the errors appearing in unit transfers (Navrud, 2010).  
Navrud (2010) proposes an eight step guideline when using a benefit transfer; this will be 
followed in the proceeding.  
1. Identify the change in the environmental good to be valued at policy site.  
The main change in environmental goods is that the biodiversity in the forest area of TRNR is 
preserved. The direct use value of recreation is assumed to remain the same, while logging and 
cabin building is prohibited. The indirect values and non-use values of biodiversity protection is 
assumed to increase. Other ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration and soil stabilization 
will also be preserved through the conservation, but these effects will not be valued monetarily in 
this analysis as biodiversity is the main focus.  
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2. Identify the affected population at the policy site. 
The affected population can be split into two groups. The directly affected are forest owners and 
municipalities, as they face restrictions on their land areas and income. Since values of national 
importance are conserved, the whole population of Norway is indirectly affected. One might 
argue that inhabitants in and around the county of Buskerud could have a larger utility increase 
from the conservation than the rest of the population, but since the recreational values are 
assumed to be constant this will not be taken into account.  
3. Conduct a literature review to identify relevant primary studies (preferably based on a 
database; but supplemented by journal and general web search) and 4. Assess the 
relevance/similarity and quality of study site values for transfer. 
After searching for relevant primary studies, one previous study clearly stood out among others 
as the most fitting. The chosen study was a survey on use and conservation of forests in Norway, 
conducted by Ståle Navrud and Henrik Lindhjem in 2007 (The data has previously been 
analyzed in Lindhjem and Navrud (2011) and Lindhjem and Navrud (2009)). Other possible 
options for benefit includes values in a meta-analysis by Lindhjem (2007), which reviews and 
analyses variation in WTP from valuation studies in Norway, Sweden and Finland from 1987-
2002, and taking values from individual surveys included in the meta-analysis.     
The chosen study site was preferred for its many similarities to the policy site; it was conducted 
just one year previous to the conservation of TRNR; it focuses on forests in southeastern Norway; 
it surveys a representative part of the Norwegian population and it asks the WTP for conserving 
forests in Norway. The subsamples used in the survey had a response rate of 69 % and 72 % 
(Lindhjem & Navrud, 2009), which is well beyond the guidelines’ minimum response rate of 
50 %. Contingent valuation (CV) was used to elicit the WTP for biodiversity protection, with 
reference to the best practice guidelines in the field. On the background of these characteristics I 
choose to do a simple unit transfer of the values from the survey to my case.  
The largest drawback when it comes to using this survey for benefit transfer is the difference in 
scale of the area that is considered. The survey considers areas that are substantially larger than 
TRNR, which means that a constant value per daa has to be assumed when scaling down the 
WTP. This is commented under part six, when the values are transferred.  
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5. Select and summarize the data available from the study site(s).  
The survey originally had ten subsamples, where alterations to certain questions were made. I 
removed two of the subsamples which only had respondents from Oslo in order to only have 
samples from one population. 
A payment card was used to elicit the respondents’ willingness to pay for an increase in 
conservation of productive forest. In all samples the respondents considered the possibility of an 
increase in protected areas from 1.4 percent to 2.8 percent. The respondents were informed that 
this increase was equivalent to an additional 1.05 million daa of protected forest. The payment 
card contained 24 alternative payments ranged in intervals that were relatively close together. 
The respondents’ willingness to pay would lie within these intervals, but one cannot say exactly 
where the data point lies. This means that there is interval censoring in the sample. I recoded the 
responds using the midpoint between each interval to capture the willingness to pay. Due to the 
closeness of the intervals and the large size of the sample I assume that the potential error in this 
method is quite small.  
In contingent valuation studies there is always a risk of getting protest answers from respondents. 
This is displayed through the respondents not being willing to state their real willingness to pay 
for the good. Some people might believe that putting a monetary value on nature is inherently 
wrong; others might have a dislike towards paying taxes. They will show this protest by ticking 
off the zero willingness to pay box or stating that they do not know their willingness to pay. This 
will not reveal their true preferences and will create a bias in the result of the analysis. It is 
therefore important to distinguish the protest answerers from the respondents that actually have a 
zero willingness to pay.  
A question following the payment card in the survey was designed to pick up on these protests, 
where the respondents that gave a “zero” or “do not know” response was asked to tick the most 
important reason for their answer. I sorted out the respondents that were characterized as 
protesters and removed them from the sample. After doing this the average willingness to pay 
increased significantly. The reason for this is that the protest zeros that are removed are then 
assumed to have the same WTP as the average respondent of the remaining sample; as opposed 
to counting them as zeros. There is some controversy surrounding the removal of protest 
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responders, as it is not given that an answer is a protest even if it is characterized as one. For this 
reason I will test if censoring the protest answers will have an altering effect on the result of the 
CBA in the sensitivity analysis. 
Skewness and kurtosis tests for normality showed that the data for willingness to pay was 
significantly non-normal in both skewness (p-value: 0.00) and kurtosis (p-value: 0.00). This 
manifests itself in a large difference between the mean and the median willingness to pay. After 
the protest answers are removed the mean WTP is 1176 NOK while the median WTP is only 600 
NOK. The median might here better represent WTP in a democratic view, as this is what the 
majority is willing to pay. Regardless of this, the mean value is the theoretically correct measure 
to use in a CBA.  
6) Transfer value estimate from study site(s) to policy site.  
 
After the alterations I found the mean annual willingness to pay for Norwegians to increase the 
level of conservation of forests from 1.4 percent to 2.8 percent, which as mentioned above 
corresponds to an increase of 1.05 million daa. To be able to apply these numbers in my analysis 
I calculated the average annual WTP per household per daa and then multiplied this with the area 
of the expanded TRNR (105 km
2
). This simplification could lead to some bias in the willingness 
to pay. In stated preference surveys on use and non-use values of ecosystems there is no 
evidence supporting that WTP increases proportionally with the size of the area (Riera et al., 
2012) and (Lindhjem, 2007). One should therefore be cautious when transferring WTP between 
areas of different sizes. The average estimated WTP per household per year for the conservation 
of TRNR is 118 NOK in the medium alternative, which does not seem like a gross 
overestimation. I choose therefore to go through with these numbers in the analysis. 
7) Calculate total benefits or costs.  
 
Using the mean willingness to pay of 118 NOK per household per year yields the net present 
values in Table 4.7.  
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Table 4.7. Net present value of households’ willingness to pay for conservation of Trillemarka-
Rollagsfjell Nature Reserve (time horizon 100 years, declining discount rate). 
 Nation Municipalities Forest owners 
NPV of WTP for 
TRNR 
7,870,536,193 
 
11,933,719 
 
430,078 
 
 
For all households in the nation this estimates a WTP of 7.8 billion NOK for the conservation of 
TRNR, this will be used as the benefit in the national CBA. In the local CBA the WTP based on 
the number of households in the three municipalities will be used, resulting in a benefit of 11.9 
million NOK. It is assumed that the WTP of the inhabitants of the municipalities does not 
deviate significantly from the national average. 
 
Increased relative income and increased scarcity of environmental goods such as biodiversity 
might lead to an increased valuation of these goods in the future. This could have been 
incorporated in the analysis by increasing the WTP with income growth. However, the 
guidelines for Norwegian CBAs, NOU (2012:16), recommends not doing this adjustment since 
the empirical background is not strong enough.   
 
8) Assess uncertainty and transfer error. 
 
When transferring values from a study site to a policy site there is as mentioned likely that some 
transfer error will occur. It is uncertain whether or not the benefit transfer yields valid 
estimations of the benefit of the project. To take this into account it is here assumed that the 
value would lie within   20 percent of the estimate of average WTP per household per year of 
the original WTP in the survey. The average WTP in the survey was found to be 1176 NOK, 
yielding a range between 941 NOK (- 20%) and 1411 NOK (+ 20%). These numbers are 
transferred to fit the size of TRNR and represent the foundation for the high and low estimates 
referred to in the results.  
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5 Results of Local Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Based on the benefits and costs evaluated in the last section the result of the local CBA is 
presented in Table 5.1 below.
19
  
Table 5.1. NPV of costs and benefits in the low, medium and high scenario at the municipal level. 
In 2008 prices, with time horizon of 100 years and declining interest rate over time. 
 Low Medium High 
Costs 
Forestry tax loss 5,440,291 9,204,182 15,469,056 
Tax loss from labor 3,973,912 13,577,532 18,397,740 
Loss in real estate tax 
and municipal fees 
13,036,037 27,570,311 30,064,874 
Administration costs 31,934,866 31,934,866 31,934,866 
Sum costs 54,385,106 82,286,891 95,866,536 
Benefits  
Administration grants 37,175,965 37,175,965 37,175,965 
WTP inhabitants 9,549,005 11,933,719 14,318,433 
Sum benefits 46,724,970 49,109,684          51,494,398  
Net Cost (NPV) 7,660,136 33,177,207 44,372,138 
 
For the medium scenario, which is considered the most likely, the municipal cost to conservation 
is estimated to be 33 million NOK when benefits are subtracted from costs. The development 
trust fund of 30 million NOK is here covering most of the costs to the municipalities.  
Going back to the utility function of the municipalities, the willingness to accept (WTA) 
conservation in the medium scenario would be equal to 33 million for the municipalities to be at 
the same utility level as before.   
  (                   )      (        ) 
The costs at the municipal level are not fully covered by the development trust fund, as 3 million 
of the costs are not compensated for. This result changes when sensitivity analysis is performed, 
by changing the interest rate and time horizon. Taking the medium scenario as a basis, a decrease 
in the time horizon from 100 years to 50 years decreases the net costs of the municipality to 22 
million NOK (see Table 11.5 in Appendix E for the complete result of sensitivity analysis with 
respect to time). An increase in the discount rate from the declining discount rate (4% to 2% over 
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 For detailed NPV calculations and sensitivity analysis, se Appendix E.  
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time) to a 4 % discount rate over the whole time period leads to a net cost of 24 million NOK 
(see Table 11.4 in Appendix E for the complete result of sensitivity analysis with respect to 
interest rate). Since the result is not robust against these alterations in assumptions, the 
hypothesis of the development fund covering the municipal costs cannot be rejected.  
In the calculation of WTP for conservation protest answers were taken out of the sample, which 
as mentioned led to an increase in WTP. Replacing the corrected WTP with the uncorrected 
WTP in the medium scenario leads the net costs to the municipalities to increase from 33 million 
NOK to 37 million NOK. This could point towards a rejection of the main hypothesis. However, 
this is refuted when performing a sensitivity analysis equivalent to the one above. An increase in 
interest rate to 4 percent yields a net cost of 27 million NOK, while a decrease in time horizon to 
50 years yields a net cost of 25 million NOK. Based on this, the conclusion that the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected remains.  
The DTF compensates the municipalities on the aggregate level in a long term perspective, but it 
delays the municipalities’ income. Only the returns of the fund can be used, so this creates a 
period of time in which income is reduced. This is to the disutility of the municipality now, but 
will be made up for by increased income in the future. Another issue is that the funds in the DTF 
are restricted to use within local business development, as opposed to tax income that has no 
strings attached. In the long term, however, this business development is assumed to lead to tax 
income which the municipality can freely decide how to spend.   
Looking at the high and low scenarios from estimations (e.g. not the sensitivity analysis) yields 
different results. Combining the lowest costs and the highest benefits yields a net cost of only 3 
million NOK to the municipalities. In this scenario the development trust fund would more than 
compensate the municipalities and they would profit well on the fund. This is the scenario that is 
most favorable to the government, with low costs on their part given that they only have to 
compensate with 3 million NOK. This also represents the scenario that environmental activists 
would stand behind, since the benefits from conservation are very high.  
The highest costs and the lowest benefits yields a municipal cost of 53 million NOK from the 
conservation. In this case the development fund should have been substantially higher in order to 
cover the costs. This scenario would be preferred by municipalities and forest owners, given that 
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the forest owners live in the municipalities that receive the fund. Even if this is the highest 
estimate in this analysis it does not come close to the proposed fund size of 100 million, which 
was suggested by local politicians and members of the opposition parties before the conservation. 
  
6 National Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In the main scenario of the local CBA it was established that a development trust fund would 
compensate the municipalities for most of their costs. Using this compensation is a part of 
achieving a Pareto improvement, as the lost utility of the cost inflicted is regained. The national 
CBA will explore if the benefits are large enough to justify this Pareto improvement. Even if the 
benefits of the policy are high enough to be able to compensate through the fund, the transfer 
does not necessarily have to be completed, as only the ability to pay is enough to conclude that 
the policy is beneficial.  
The national CBA takes into account different aspects than the local CBA. In the national CBA it 
will be assumed that other municipalities would take over the reduced supply of timber and 
cabins from the affected municipalities, so that the aggregated effect of the conservation with 
respect to this would be negligible.  
This analysis will assume that the nature values in TRNR are unique and that the conservation of 
this particular area was necessary. This assumption could be disputed by arguing that other areas 
in Norway could preserve most of the values in TRNR, and that for instance the size could have 
been reduced without loss in nature value. Although this is a relevant consideration, it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to get into these issues.  
        
6.1 Benefits 
The benefits of establishing TRNR are based on the same calculations as in the local analysis. It 
is assumed that since the reserve contains nature values of national importance, the protection of 
these values are affecting the whole population of Norway. As in the local analysis the use 
values, such as fishing, hunting and berry picking, are not assumed to change significantly as a 
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result of the conservation. This leaves non-use values and indirect values, which are valued in 
the contingent valuation study that is used for benefit transfer. For the nation as a whole the 
estimated benefit of TRNR, over 100 years with a declining discount rate, is 7.8 billion NOK as 
shown in Table 4.7.  
 
6.2 Compensation for Reduced Income from Forestry 
The forest owners in the area were compensated by the government for their loss of economic 
value as a result of the conservation on their properties. The value of timber was the most 
substantial part of the compensation, where site quality and tree species were taken into account. 
Forest owners were also compensated to some degree for increased difficulties regarding 
transportation, access to property and operating costs (Ekanger, 2013). The municipalities also 
owned some forest areas, which were compensated for in the same way as the forest owners. All 
the compensations were based upon direct economic loss; areas that did not have a market value 
were not compensated for.  
Many of the forest owners were frustrated with the process, feeling that they did not have any 
say in what was happening on their property. Some felt that they were being “punished” for 
taking care of the forest so well that many of the nature values were still intact. These feelings 
were also a loss related to the conservation, but they were not been compensated for in any way 
(Ekanger, 2013).    
The process of agreeing upon compensation for the forest owners has been long and dreary; the 
conservation was a fact in 2008, while most compensation agreements were in place as late as at 
the end of 2012. In addition to a high conflict level, the large costs involved in the conservation 
delayed payments as a result of insufficient funding through the government budget. There are 
still a few forest owners that have not agreed to the compensations they were offered, and it is 
uncertain when they will reach an agreement. By the time this thesis was written the total 
compensation paid to the 101 forest owners that have accepted the agreement were 
approximately 82 million NOK. In addition to this compensation was also paid for forest areas 
owned by Rollag and Sigdal municipality, which amounted to approximately 20 million NOK. 
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This leads to a combined compensation cost of 93 million NOK. It will be assumed that the 
valuation and compensation is correct according to the actual timber values.  
 
6.3 Processing cost  
In addition to compensation costs the government also incurs processing costs when an area is 
conserved. This includes costs related to recording of species and nature values, forest experts, 
lawyers and administrative procedures in environmental management (Skjeggedal, Gundersen, 
Harvold, & Vistad, 2010 p. 120). TRNR was conserved through a command and control 
approach, where there was not a voluntary agreement with the local community on the regulation. 
In this type of conservation the processing costs are usually larger than when an area is 
conserved through voluntary agreements. Skjeggedal et. al (2010) found the processing cost 
averaging at 35 percent for command and control regulation, as opposed to 20 percent through 
voluntary conservation. For simplicity the average 35 percent processing cost will be used in the 
analysis. In addition to the compensation and processing cost there are also administrative cost; 
see the local CBA for a description of these costs.  
  
6.4 Marginal Cost of Public Funds  
When the government is compensating forest owners and municipalities for their loss as a result 
of their provision of a public good this is assumed to be financed through taxes. Hence, it is 
assumed that additional tax revenues would have to be raised to achieve this financing. There are 
transaction costs associated with this tax collection, both through loss of efficiency and through 
administrative costs. The marginal cost of 1 NOK of public spending is calculated to be 20 
percent at average (NOU 2012:16, p. 20).  
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7 Results of National Cost-Benefit Analysis  
Based on the benefits and costs evaluated in the last section the result of the national CBA is 
presented in Table 7.1 below:  
Table 7.1. Net present values of benefits and costs in national CBA. In 2008 prices, with time 
horizon of 100 years and declining interest rate over time. 
Benefits  
Willingness to pay  7,870,536,193 
Costs 
Compensation to forest owners 94,920,761 
Development trust fund 30,000,000 
Processing costs 43,722,266 
Administration of reserve 37,175,965 
Marginal cost of tax collection 41,163,798 
Sum costs  246,982,791 
 
Net benefit (in NPV) 7,623,553,402 
 
The benefits from establishing TRNR at the national level clearly outweighs the costs, with a net 
present benefit of 7,6 billion NOK. Some might argue that the WTP derived from the survey is 
larger than the actual WTP among the population. This is a common critique of results from 
contingent valuation studies. The WTP can in this case be lowered drastically and still cover the 
costs of establishing the reserve. The costs are covered even when the willingness to pay is only 
4 NOK per household per year, which yields a benefit of 267,705,313 NOK. As mentioned 
above TRNR contains natural areas of national importance, which is the reason why the whole 
population is counted in the analysis. This could be questioned by reasoning that the benefits 
occurring do not reach beyond the local level. In response to this, I find that even by only 
considering the benefit from WTP for conservation in the county of Buskerud, the benefits will 
still outweigh the costs, yielding a net benefit of 416,610,571 NOK.  
Sensitivity analysis with respect to interest rate and time horizon did not change the sign of the 
NPV in the national CBA. Since most of the costs have already incurred changing the time 
horizon or interest rate on them has no effect on the result. Changing the time horizon to 50 and 
then to 25 years reduced the NPV of the benefits to 5.8 billion NOK and 4.1 billion NOK 
respectively, while increasing the interest rate to 4 percent reduced the NPV of the benefits to 6 
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billion. None of these changes resulted in a change in the result of the national CBA. This is as 
expected considering the magnitude of the NPV of the benefits compared to the costs.   
 
8 Instruments  
Through the local CBA it has been established that municipalities are incurring some costs as a 
result of conservation in forests, and the national CBA has shown that the benefits from 
conservation are large enough to cover compensation of these costs. On the premise of this the 
following section will go through alternative instruments that are used in conservation, keeping 
in mind the guidelines from the theory section (Boadway & Shah, 2009). The development trust 
fund will be compared to changing the municipal distribution key and using Ecological Fiscal 
Transfers (EFT). Voluntary conservation for forest owners and regulation will also be evaluated, 
to take into account that compensation of municipalities does not necessarily have to take place.  
Benefits and costs in the CBAs should be seen in light of the budget for forest conservation in 
Norway. In 2013 the government budget for forest conservation was 231 million NOK, which 
was the largest appropriation to this budget entry of all time. In comparison the annual benefit 
from the conservation of TRNR is estimated to be 266 million in 2013 NOK
20
 in the national 
CBA. This exceeds the entire budget for the total funds for all forest conservation projects in the 
country for one whole year. Hence, the estimated benefits are not even close to being consistent 
with the amount of funds set off to this purpose by the government. Using the net benefit from 
conservation based on WTP-data would justify instruments that are unlikely to receive sufficient 
funding in real life. If the politicians were basing their budget on the result of this type of data, 
the spending on biodiversity protection should have been substantially higher than it currently is.  
The government has recently signaled that forest conservation is a priority both in terms of 
biodiversity protection and carbon sequestration, which may lead to increased future funding 
(Ministry of the Environment, 2012). It remains to be seen if results from valuation studies will 
contribute to increase future budgets. But for now, keeping the current budget in mind will 
ensure that the discussion stays within reasonable limits.  
                                                 
20
 This is the annual benefit from WTP in 2008 NOK adjusted to January 2013 prices with the consumer price index.  
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8.1 Development Trust Fund 
The purpose of the development fund in TRNR was, as previously stated, to compensate the 
municipalities for their lost business opportunities as a result of the conservation. A total of 30 
million NOK were given to the municipalities over a period of five years. According to the 
Ministry of the Environment there was no official record of the reasoning behind the size of the 
development trust fund (conversation with senior advisor Asbjørn Solås, 22 February 2013). It 
was decided through a political process that is not open to the public.  
The development trust fund is set up to benefit the local community for many generations ahead, 
as only the returns of the investments made with the fund is used. A fund size of 30 million NOK 
does not yield much to spend during the first years, which has led to some impatience in the local 
community. It also requires the municipalities to administer the fund in a profitable way, making 
investments that give reasonably good returns.  
As the use of the development trust fund has a long term perspective, there are few projects that 
have been supported by it to date. The project VER-DI is partly funded by the development fund, 
and has made some contributions to tourism in the area. The project has made a smartphone 
application for the Trillemarka area to make visits easier and more interesting; and has also 
developed a bicycle route around the reserve. This type of work could help increase nature based 
tourism around nature reserves, which would yield growth for private business within the 
municipalities.     
For future use there are several conditions that should be fulfilled in order for a development 
trust fund to work as an incentive for municipalities to welcome conservation within their 
borders. In line with the guidelines for good policy instruments, there must be a prospect of 
receiving compensation from the beginning of the conservation process for it to give any 
incentives for conservation. Some have argued that in the TRNR case the DTF was given at the 
end of the conservation process as a consolation for not choosing the alternative that the local 
community wanted. The size of the fund should be grounded in an expectation of future loss 
from conservation in order to justify the spending, as opposed to a closed political decision. The 
municipalities should also be able to show results from the outgoing funds, to ensure efficiency 
of spending.  
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As mentioned in the discussion on results of the local CBA, there are some issues regarding the 
DTF’s restrictions on spending. For the DTF to be a full compensation for the fiscal loss of tax 
income, the funds should have been without restrictions. The purpose of the fund takes the 
municipalities’ wish for business development into account, but for the municipalities’ autonomy 
to be fully preserved they should be able to decide whether or not they wanted to spend the funds 
on business development.   
Taking the government budget for forest conservation into account, the size of the development 
fund in the TRNR case is of a realistic magnitude. This speaks in favor of using a development 
fund in the future, as it is something that is likely to fit in the budget.  
 
8.2 Municipal Distribution Key21 
One of the alternative proposed instruments to deal with environmental costs for municipalities 
is to include it in the cost equalizing transfer
22
 from the government to the municipalities (Barton 
et al., 2012). The cost equalizing part of a governmental transfer in Norway is supposed to 
compensate municipalities for having to provide services with costs they do not have the power 
to influence. For example, a municipality whose population has a large proportion of people over 
the age of 70 would get extra funds to be able to provide the services that these citizens are 
entitled to. In this way the extra costs of having many elderly is equalized by the cost equalizing 
transfer.  
This transfer has to be based on objective criteria, which means that it is only supposed to 
compensate for costs that the municipality cannot change. In the context of biodiversity 
protection, this instrument could hence not be used to give incentives to conserve more on its 
own initiative. In the specific case of TRNR the conservation was imposed by the State, so that 
the municipalities did not have the power to change the costs, and in this way the cost equalizer 
could have been used to compensate them.  
In an effort to include environmental costs in the municipal distribution key Håkonsen and 
Lunder (2009) made some tentative calculations of a new distribution within cost equalizing. The 
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 In Norwegian: Kommunenøkkel 
22
 In Norwegian: Utgiftsutjevningen 
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criteria that proved to significantly explain the variation in environmental costs in their analysis 
was a base criteria, conserved area per capita, total area per capita, population size and sparsely 
populated areas. They calculated the effect of using this new cost equalizer and found what 
changes it would yield between the municipalities. Table 8.1
23
 below shows the potential annual 
change in transfers to the municipalities Sigdal, Rollag and Nore og Uvdal.   
Table 8.1. Grants to municipalities Sigdal, Rollag and Nore og Uvdal if the costs equalization 
distribution was changed with respect to environmental costs, according to estimations in 
Håkonsen and Lunder (2009). 
 Sigdal Rollag Nore og Uvdal 
In total 287,671 NOK 3,701 NOK 711,160 NOK 
Per capita 82 NOK 3 NOK 274 NOK 
 
For all three municipalities combined the annual increase in transfers sum up to 1,002,532 NOK, 
which with a declining discount rate and a time horizon of 100 years, leads to a net present value 
of 31.8 million NOK. This would almost cover the previously calculated net costs of 
conservation to the municipalities in the TRNR case (33 million NOK). However, this sum is 
also supposed to equalize the costs of all other environmental obligations the municipalities may 
have. As the nature reserve is not the only environmental cost for these municipalities, this is not 
likely to give as adequate compensation as the DTF.  
Also, it should be noted that Nore og Uvdal benefits substantially more than the two other 
municipalities from the change in the cost equalizer, while only a small part of TRNR, and hence 
also the cost, lies within Nore og Uvdal.  
The change in cost equalizing transfers is supposed to be self-financing, so the municipalities 
that do not fill the criteria to receive extra grants for environmental tasks are paying for the 
municipalities that do. This means that there is a shift in distribution from one set of 
municipalities to the other. With the proposed distribution the municipalities that are entitled to 
the highest grants to cover their environmental cost happen to coincide with the municipalities 
that already have a relatively high income per capita (Håkonsen & Lunder, 2009). This should be 
                                                 
23
 The data in this table was obtained through one of the authors of the report, Trond Erik Lunder, as these particular 
municipalities were not discussed in the report.   
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dealt with through the income equalization transfers between the municipalities, so this “unfair” 
distribution outcome should not have an effect on policy making. However, as the authors note, 
it can be less politically viable to propose a change in transfers that for the most supports the 
most affluent municipalities.  
 
8.3 Ecological Fiscal Transfers (EFT) 
Internationally, covering environmental costs through an instrument such as cost equalizing 
comes under the term Ecological Fiscal Transfers (EFT). EFT’s have been in use in Brazil and 
Portugal for several years. In addition to environmental cost equalization, the term EFT also 
includes fiscal transfers that are based on the environmental accomplishments of each 
municipality.  
In Brazil a part of the value added tax (VAT) is earmarked transfers for both cost equalization 
and also as explicit incentives for improving the quality of conservation; stricter protected area 
categories are for example weighted more heavily in the calculation of transferred funds (Ring, 
2008). If this were to be used in the TRNR case the municipalities could have received funds 
based on their additional contribution to conservation, beyond non-voluntary state-imposed 
conservation of TRNR. The funds are distributed after an Ecological Index ranging from 0 to 1, 
in which the municipality with the highest index number represents the municipality that has the 
best quality conservation within its borders (see Appendix B for a more detailed description of 
how the funds are distributed). The municipality that conserves the largest areas with the highest 
conservation quality will get the largest share of the available funds.   
There are several issues with using this type of transfer in Norway. An Ecological Index would 
first of all have to be established; using the Nature Index
24
 could be a possibility here, but it 
needs to be further developed on the local level first. Statistics Norway has been working on this 
the past year, but it has proven more difficult than expected.  
The transfer system as it has been introduced in other countries would also require earmarking of 
public funds, which is generally opposed by the Ministry of Finance (Barton et al., 2012; 
                                                 
24
 In Norwegian: Naturindeksen  
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Håkonsen & Lunder, 2009). To justify earmarking externalities across municipal borders would 
have to be established. Until this is thoroughly proven it will be difficult to get such an 
instrument approved politically. Considering the opposition against earmarking, it is somewhat a 
paradox that the government allows for specific restrictions within the DTF, but is skeptical to 
earmarking funds through the transfer system described here.  
There could potentially be high costs involved in sustaining a new system like this, which the 
current budget does not allow for. When taking these issues into account it seems more likely 
that development trust funds could work as a future instrument for encouraging conservation 
among municipalities in Norway, as the use of development funds already are established within 
Norwegian politics.  
 
8.4 Voluntary Conservation for Forest Owners 
An alternative to the command and control approach of conservation is protection through 
voluntary conservation. Solutions where forest owners voluntarily give up parts of their property 
for conservation is being used more and more. This could have been a possibility in one of the 
suggested plans for TRNR, which was termed the “forest owner accepted” alternative, in which 
about 99 km
2
 was proposed to be conserved as opposed to the 148 km
2
 that was the final 
outcome. The problem with this solution is that it was not regarded as comprehensive enough to 
give adequate protection of biodiversity, since the area was simply not big enough.   
Voluntary and traditional conservation is supposed to yield the same amount of compensation to 
the forest owners. However, there is some information that voluntary conservation leads to more 
generous payments. In a contingent valuation survey Lindhjem and Mitani (2012) asked private 
forest owners their annual willingness to accept (WTA) to give up parts of their land for 
conservation, and found an estimate mean WTA of 180 NOK per daa per year. As this WTA was 
stated as an annual payment one cannot simply compare these estimates to a one-time payment, 
but the values could be taken as an indication of the range in which WTA estimates lie. When 
looking at the compensations made in the TRNR case the mean calculated sum based on 
foregone timber earnings per daa was 744 NOK. The accepted compensation only covers about 
four years of compensation with the stated WTA. Based on this it seems that voluntary 
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conservation would be more costly than command and control approach in terms of 
compensation of forest owners. Nonetheless, one cannot draw any conclusions based upon this 
result, as the WTA also included non-timber benefits, which was only considered to a small 
degree in the compensation calculation. There are also several factors that would need to be 
corrected for in order to compare the payments, such as errors in transforming payments into 
mean values and case specific factors.  
In areas of a size where voluntary conservation is possible, it seems unnecessary to compensate 
municipalities with a development fund. This is under the assumption that forest owners consider 
conservation more profitable than alternative use on the property. In this analysis the municipal 
costs have been based mostly on lost tax revenue from foregone income from forestry and cabin 
building. If the forest owner does not see any profitability in doing this it is difficult to justify 
loss for the municipalities.  
 
8.5 Regulation 
As showed throughout the analysis the municipalities have different priorities than the 
government when it comes to land use. This could be dealt with through economic instruments, 
such as the ones mentioned in this paper. Another approach to this would simply be to regulate 
the land use by law. In the TRNR case the government could have just conserved the area 
without compensating the municipalities at all. This would arguably be cheaper than using 
economic measures, but there are some issues related to this method. The Nature Diversity Act 
and Forestry Act already mandate the municipalities with several environmental tasks that are 
not currently being followed through (Riksrevisjonen, 2012). This indicates that regulation may 
not be enough to reach the level of environmental consciousness that is required to reach set 
goals. Additionally, increased regulation takes away the autonomy of the municipalities in these 
matters, leaving more decisions to be made on the centralized level. This is not desired from the 
municipal or the centralized level of government.  
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9 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
Through this analysis I have found that the hypothesis that the development fund in the TRNR 
case has compensated the municipalities for their costs from conservation cannot be rejected. In 
the main alternative in the local CBA the development trust fund did not cover the full cost to 
municipalities from conserving. However, when sensitivity analysis was performed on the main 
results of the local CBA they were not robust to changes in interest rate and time horizon. 
Increasing the discount rate and/or reducing the time horizon reduced the municipal costs such 
that the development trust fund would cover them. Still, when considering the main alternative, 
the size of the development trust fund (30 MNOK) does not deviate much from the estimated 
costs (33 MNOK). 
The national CBA showed that benefits by far exceeded costs when allowing for compensation 
of the municipal costs. This fulfills the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of the beneficiaries being able to 
compensate the cost inflicted. According to the analysis the excess benefit could sustain high 
compensation payments for both municipalities and forest owners (and other affected parties), 
which then could lead to a Pareto improvement. However, the benefit found in the analysis is 
much larger than the funds actually allocated to forest conservation in the government budget.   
The development trust fund is in many ways a preferred instrument by the municipalities as they 
can spend the funds on measures that are of priority to them. Still, if the fund was without 
restrictions on spending, this would yield an even higher utility to the municipalities and better 
preserve their autonomy.   
The fund is found to have the highest relevance in conserving larger conjoining areas, where 
voluntary conservation is made difficult. Reasoning from an opportunity cost perspective a fund 
seems unfounded in areas where forest owners decide that the best use of their property is to 
voluntarily conserve it. As an increasing number of conservation cases are solved through 
voluntary conservation and fewer areas are being conserved in the traditional way, it seems 
better to consider a development fund in each individual case rather than incorporating it 
structurally. Assuming that the areas that are most easily (voluntarily) conserved will be 
conserved first, a fund would be useful in reaching a high enough percentage of conserved 
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productive forest when conservation becomes more problematic. Hence, a policy mix is 
recommended; using voluntary conservation when possible and using a development trust fund 
in combination with forest owner compensation in non-voluntary conservation.   
Given that high local costs among both municipalities and forest owners are preventing the 
necessary increase in biodiversity protection, providing a development trust fund can be 
recommended as a policy that can deal with these costs. In combination with compensation to 
forest owners it can be a useful instrument in conserving areas that otherwise would prove 
difficult to protect.  
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11 Appendices  
11.1 Appendix A  
This appendix gives a picture of the plans the municipalities had for the TRNR area before 
conservation, see Figure 11.1 and explanation below.  
 
Figure 11.1. Map showing municipal plans in the area in and around TRNR from the assessment 
of the reserve in 2005 (County Governor of Buskerud, 2005). 
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The darker orange parts were existing cabin sites at the time, while the lighter orange represented 
future plans for building. The brown parts represent areas set off for what was termed “long term 
development”, but it was not explicitly stated what the specific plans for development were. The 
black dotted line was the environmental activists proposed size of the reserve, while the green 
dotted line shows the forest owner and municipal suggestion of conservation. Several of the 
areas for planned development and cabin sites are adjacent to the borders of the reserve. These 
areas are assumed to have had a natural expansion into the reserve if it had not been conserved.   
 
11.2 Appendix B  
This appendix contains a detailed overview of the EFT system where municipalities are awarded 
for both quantity and quality of their conserved areas.  
There are variations on how the EFT system works, but it usually is carried out in the following 
way (Ring, 2008). Each municipality has an Ecological Index (EI), which is a number between 0 
and 1:  
     
    
   
  
EIi consists of a municipal conservation factor (MCFi) which is divided by the national 
conservation factor (NCF).  
     ∑    
 
   
 
The national conservation factor is the sum of all municipal conservation factors. 
      
   
          
 
The municipal conservation factor (MCFi) consists of the area of conservation units in a 
municipality divided by the total area of the municipality.  
     ∑                                   
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The conservation unit is the sum of all protected areas in the municipality each multiplied with a 
conservation weight.  
The conservation weights, which range from 0.1 to 1 are decided upon how well an area is 
protected. An area that is very well protected, such as a nature reserve, would have a high 
conservation weight of e.g. 1. An area that is only protected to some degree, such as a buffer 
zone, would have a low conservation weight of e.g. 0.1. By conserving an area a municipality 
would then get an increase in conservation units, which again would lead to an increase in their 
municipal conservation factor, yielding a higher Ecological Index, which leads to receiving a 
higher proportion of funds.  This way the municipality that conserves the largest areas of the 
highest quality will get the largest grant. 
 
11.3 Appendix C  
This appendix contains tables and information on data used in the estimation of lost tax income 
from forestry.  
 
Difficulties  
As mentioned in note 11, I tried to obtain information on the tax income from forestry to the 
municipalities to check if my calculations were within a realistic range, but this proved much 
more difficult than expected. None of the local treasurers nor those responsible for forest 
statistics from Statistics Norway had received a request for this type of information earlier. 
Everyone referred me to each other, and no one seemed to know where the information could be 
obtained. The conclusion seemed to be that the tax assessment office had the information, but 
they do not have a phone number. Both I and one of the local treasurers emailed them, and after 
more than two months they replied that the local treasurer should have this information.  
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Table 11.1. Average income from forestry sorted by year and size of productive forest area (daa) 
for Norwegian forest owners with more than 25 daa of productive forest. Prices in parenthesis 
are 2008 prices, CPI adjusted. 
 2008 2009 (2008 
prices) 
2010 (2008 
prices) 
2011 (2008 
prices) 
Average 
(in 2008 
prices) 
 Forestry 
income in 
NOK 
Forestry 
income in 
NOK 
Forestry 
income in 
NOK 
Forestry 
income in 
NOK 
Forestry 
income in 
NOK 
25-99 dekar 23000 14000 (13710) 16000 
(15291) 
17000 
(16048) 
17012 
100-249 
dekar 
19000 18000 (17627) 20000 
(19114) 
21000 
(19824) 
18891 
250-499 
dekar 
23000 22000 (21545) 23000 
(21982) 
25000 
(23600) 
22532 
500-999 
dekar 
33000 37000 (36235) 33000 
(31539) 
33000 
(31152) 
32982 
1 000-1 999 
dekar 
47000 41000 (40152) 44000 
(42052) 
48000 
(45312) 
43629 
2 000-4 999 
dekar 
79000 74000 (72470) 80000 
(76459) 
80000 
(75521) 
75863 
5 000-19 
999 dekar 
193000 176000 
(172359) 
182000 
(173945) 
201000 
(189747) 
182263 
20 000 
dekar or 
more 
551000 504000 
(493575) 
471000 
(453575) 
434000 
(409703) 
476109 
 
Table 11.2. Distribution of forest properties by size in absolute numbers and percentages for 
Norway, Buskerud County and TRNR respectively. 
Area 
(daa) 
25 - 
20 000 
25-99 100-
249 
250-
499 
500-999 1 000-
1 999 
2 000-
4 999 
5 000-
19 999 
20 000- 
Norway 131,785 45,904 34,663 22,605 15,773 8,015 3,585 1,009 231 
% 100% 35% 26% 17% 12% 6% 3% 1% 0.2% 
Buskerud 7,738 2,137 1,873 1,325 1,169 678 408 136 12 
% 100% 28% 24% 17% 15% 9% 5% 2% 0.2% 
TRNR 91 22 24 19 14 10 1 1 - 
% 100% 24% 26% 21% 15% 11% 1% 1% - 
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Table 11.3. Timber price development in nominal prices and 2011 prices, 1965-2011. 
Year Nominal 
NOK 
2011 
NOK 
Year Nominal 
NOK 
2011 
NOK 
1965 101 921 1988 326 541 
1966 98 858 1989 350 557 
1967 87 727 1990 362 553 
1968 87 709 1991 333 497 
1969 93 697 1992 282 411 
1970 100 697 1993 293 421 
1971 96 632 1994 373 522 
1972 99 612 1995 336 466 
1973 130 734 1996 329 450 
1974 160 812 1997 344 459 
1975 164 761 1998 340 443 
1976 183 780 1999 334 426 
1977 181 705 2000 322 398 
1978 176 650 2001 327 392 
1979 190 657 2002 301 356 
1980 220 661 2003 296 342 
1981 227 609 2004 305 351 
1982 222 541 2005 318 360 
1983 247 565 2006 313 347 
1984 261 565 2007 375 412 
1985 282 576 2008 364 386 
1986 308 575 2009 307 318 
1987 335 584 2010 355 359 
   2011 364 364 
 
 
11.4 Appendix D 
This appendix contains questionnaire questions from the CV survey and STATA (statistics 
program, version 11) commands used for analysis. 
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WTP question 
What is the most your household almost certainly is willing to pay in an extra annual tax 
earmarked to a public fund for increased forest protection from today’s level of 1.4% to 
2.8% of productive forest area? Choose the highest amount, if anything, your household 
almost certainly will pay. 
 
     (Check one)  
      0  
  25  
  50  
  100  
  300  
  500  
  700  
  900  
  1100  
  1400  
  1800  
  2200  
  2700  
  3200  
  3800  
60 
 
  4400  
  5100  
  5800  
  7000  
  8500  
  10000  
  13000  
  15000  
  More than 15000  
  Don’t know  
    Specify amount in kr per year (if higher than 15000) 
________________ 
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 Revealing protest answers 
Choose the statements below that best describe why you were not willing to pay anything 
to increase forest protection. 
    (Check no more than two statements) 
     It is the government’s responsibility to protect forests 
  I cannot afford to pay anything for this*
25
 
  The tax level is high enough as it is 
  What I say will not affect whether the plans will be carried out or not 
  Today’s level of forest protection is good as it is* 
  It is too difficult to give an amount 
  I feel it is not right to value vulnerable and threatened species in monetary terms in this 
way 
  Those who destroy the habitat where these plant and animal species live should pay  
  The species can be preserved through environmentally cautious forestry - more 
protection is not necessary* 
  We already pay enough to the farmers owning the forests 
  I don’t know* 
 
  
                                                 
25
 Answers characterized as true zeros are marked with an asterisk (*). 
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STATA commands in WTP estimation
26
 
cd C:\Users\Aina\Dropbox\Masteroppgave\Statistikk 
use skogdata.dta, clear 
* spm11a represents payment card for all respondents (household) 
sum spm11a 
histogram spm11a 
* dropping oslo samples, to not mix the two populations Oslo and Norway 
drop if utvalg2 == 2  
drop if utvalg2 == 10  
* running the command keep if fylke == 6 shows that 152 of the respondents 
* are from buskerud county in original dataset without any alterations: no significant difference 
in WTP 
* dropping "failed to respond to WTP" respondents from mail survey 
drop if spm11a == 26 
* recoding spm11a, midpoint between intervals represent wtp, set do not know as 0 
recode spm11a (1=0) (2=37.5) (3=75) (4=200) (5=400) (6=600) (7=800) (8=1000) (9=1250) 
(10=1600) (11=2000) (12=2450) (13=2950) (14=3500) (15=4100) (16=4750) (17=5450) 
(18=6400) (19=7750) (20=9250) (21=11500) (22=13000) (23=15000) (24=25167.5) (25=0), 
generate (wtpb) 
sum wtpb, detail  
                                                 
26
 Note that any command starting with an asterisk (*) is a comment  
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* finding protest answers and dropping them (from original dataset all together 1251 
observations deleted) 
* out of 1429 people answering 0 or do not know, 1251 were categorized as protests 
* after the criteria of ticking off reason 1,3,4,6,7,8 or 10 in question 17. 
drop if spm17c01 ==1, drop if spm17c03 ==1, drop if spm17c04==1, drop if spm17c06 ==1 
drop if spm17c07 ==1, drop if spm17c08 ==1, drop if spm17c10 ==1  
sum wtpb, detail  
sktest wtpb 
* sktest shows that wtpb is significantly non-normal in skewness and kurtosis, large difference in 
median and mean 
11.5 Appendix E 
This appendix contains extended information on calculations made in the cost-benefit analyses.  
Table 11.8 through Table 11.11 reach over several pages and contains details on the calculation 
of net present values.   
Table 11.4. Result of sensitivity analysis on local CBA with respect to interest rate, given in NPV 
with time horizon of 100 years. Low discount rate of 2%, medium discount rate declining from 4% 
to 2%, high discount rate of 4%.  
Discount rate  2% 4%-2% 4% 
Costs  
Forestry tax loss 12,513,123 9,204,182 7,097,992 
Labor tax loss 13,577,532 13,577,532 13,577,532 
Real estate tax+  
municipal fees 
39,026,674 27,570,311 18,217,559 
Administration 44,290,669 31,934,866 25,638,800 
Sum 109,407,998 82,286,892 64,531,883 
Benefits  
WTP 16,223,939 11,933,719 9,202,930 
Adm 49,772,595 37,175,965 30,879,898 
Sum 65,996,535 49,109,683 40,082,828 
Net costs (in NPV) 43,411,464 33,177,208 24,449,055 
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Table 11.5. Result of sensitivity analysis of local CBA with respect to time. Given in NPV, with 
declining discount rate. Time horizons of 25, 50 and 100 years. 
Years  25 50 100 
Costs 
Forestry tax loss 4,810,929 6,774,910 9,204,182 
Labor tax loss 13,577,532 13,577,532 13,577,532 
Real estate tax+  
municipal fees 
8,839,677 15,814,861 27,570,311 
Administration 16,755,881 23,541,567 31,934,866 
Sum 43,984,019 59,708,870 82,286,892 
Benefits  
WTP 6,237,628 8,784,036 11,933,719 
Administration 21,996,979 28,782,665 37,175,965 
Sum 28,234,608 37,566,701 49,109,683 
Net costs (in NPV) 15,749,411 22,142,169 33,177,208 
 
Table 11.6. Result of sensitivity analysis on local CBA with uncorrected WTP with respect to 
interest rate, given in NPV with time horizon of 100 years. Low discount rate of 2%, medium 
discount rate declining from 4% to 2%, high discount rate of 4%. 
Discount rate  2% 4%-2% 4% 
Costs  
Forestry tax loss 12,513,123 9,204,182 7,097,992 
Labor tax loss 13,577,532 13,577,532 13,577,532 
Real estate tax+  
municipal fees 
39,026,674 27,570,311 18,217,559 
Administration 44,290,669 31,934,866 25,638,800 
Sum 109,407,998 82,286,892 64,531,883 
Benefits  
WTP 11,547,140 8,493,642 6,550,044 
Adm 49,772,595 37,175,965 30,879,898 
Sum 65,996,535 49,109,683 40,082,828 
Net costs (in NPV) 48,088,262 36,617,285 27,101,940 
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Table 11.7. Result of sensitivity analysis of local CBA with uncorrected WTP with respect to time. 
Given in NPV, with declining discount rate. Time horizons of 25, 50 and 100 years. 
Years  25 50 100 
Costs 
Forestry tax loss 4,810,929 6,774,910 9,204,182 
Labor tax loss 13,577,532 13,577,532 13,577,532 
Real estate tax+  
municipal fees 
8,839,677 15,814,861 27,570,311 
Administration 16,755,881 23,541,567 31,934,866 
Sum 43,984,019 59,708,870 82,286,892 
Benefits  
WTP 4,439,536 6,251,903 8,493,642 
Administration 21,996,979 28,782,665 37,175,965 
Sum 28,234,608 37,566,701 49,109,683 
Net costs (in NPV) 17,547,503 24,674,302 36,617,285 
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